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Ethical expectations constrain and so limit the beliefs or actions of agents.  When there is 
such an expectation, someone comes to count on or rely on another to do or believe something; 
someone anticipates and plans (perhaps loosely) around the agent believing or acting in some 
way. The agent is entrusted with an expanse of openness or social space within which to act or to 
form beliefs (agency space) and is made responsible to act or believe in a way respecting the 
spirit if not also the letter of the constraints understood within the expectations. 
Clearly, these are not merely predictive expectations, though they are that.  Rather, they 
involve a call on the agent to restrict belief or behavior appropriately relative to favoring certain 
possibilities rather than others.  And this restriction is to be an expression of a defensible choice.  
Still that does not quite capture the point.  A response to force or out of blind conformity to 
social rules or even out of habit might in some ways involve and express choice that is 
defensible.  And expectations of belief and action associated with (compelling) force, (blind) 
following of customary practice, or habit are not in question here.  When someone counts on or 
relies on another as a matter of ethical expectation the responsibility involved requires that the 
agent will act or believe in ways informed by critical reasoning.  Reponses to such expectations 
are presumed to be within the agent’s control and to have been chosen in a way that is subject to 
the influence of, if not actually influenced by, critical thought which invokes acceptable reasons.1
Philosophers have adopted the term, “normativity,” to focus on the reasoned and 
impelling character of just such expectations.  And by extension, the dimension of agency which 
ethics and ethical reasoning introduce into our lives is the normative.  In line with these 
practices, we speak of normative expectations as opposed to those resting on power or force, and 
as opposed to those based on causal knowledge, or even those based on knowledge of the habits 
of an agent. 
This discussion comprises an exploration of some aspects of normativity.  In particular, 
after some introduction to the relationships between several dimensions of normativity, I wish to 
concentrate on the possible basis of an agent’s claim to legitimacy for an act or belief.  The 
discussion proceeds first by looking to conditions of legitimacy of assertions within the frame of 
critical thought.  There, it will seek a set of characteristics or virtues of the critical thinker who, 
in general, might claim legitimacy for beliefs or decisions and the actions expressing them.  
Second, I wish to supplement this picture by considering ethical thinking as an expression of 
critical thought.  In this way I shall try to articulate general constraints on the thought of ethical 
agents who are able to claim normative legitimacy for their decisions and acts.  Thus I shall seek 
to argue that normative legitimacy in ethics is partially ensured by, though not reducible to, the 
normativity characteristic of critical thinking.  Having gone that far, I will be in a position to say 
something about the role of reason in ethics and about the need to supplement reason with 
feeling or attitude, as well as our personal commitments to undertakings and entanglements with 
others.  In effect then I will be suggesting sources of the salience of action that go beyond 
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concerns for legitimacy or impartiality of action.  The final section returns to the question of the 
role of critical reasoning in founding the defensibility of reasons in ethics.  This portion of my 
discussion will suggest how we might understand and respond to the request for founding the 
constraints generating the ethical defensibility of the salience of various options of action within 
the features of reality or within the features of the real in ethical agency space. 
 
 
Section I.  The Three Dimensions of Normativity 
 
Normativity understood as I have suggested is a truly complex matter comprising at least 
three dimensions tightly interrelated in an intricate personal and social dynamic.  The first is that 
of legitimacy:  normative expectations include a call for agents to at least be able to articulate 
and provide for their beliefs, choices or actions, reasons that are defensible, both to the agent 
and to others.  This is ambiguous of course.  We need to distinguish between an abstract and a 
personal notion of legitimacy, or, respectively between an evidentiary and a virtue oriented 
notion of legitimacy.  Abstract legitimacy is the fact of there being reasons supporting an act or 
belief or choice that are defensible either to all at every moment, or even to all in some 
epistemically ideal circumstances, and thus trivially the fact of its being possible in the ideal (of 
there being an opportunity just in the presence of such reasons), for someone (not necessarily the 
agent) to find and give such reasons.2,3  In this sense, calls for the abolition of slavery were 
always legitimate even though as a matter of cultural limitations upon imagination, ill will bred 
of avarice, meanness, and social practice among other things, in some cultures, at various times, 
defensible reasons for the abolition of slavery have not been within the reach of some agents.  In 
this way, such reasons could provide evidentiary support for a claim of what is the best course of 
action, even though such reasons were not available in any significant sense to the agent. 
Notice that we would do well to not expect agents to act only with abstract legitimacy.  
Since it is not within the control of anyone at any time to grasp reasons making an act abstractly 
legitimate (reasons that are defensible either to all at every moment, or to all in some 
epistemically ideal circumstances), then if we set expectations within the realm of the abstractly 
legitimate we would counsel reaching for the epistemic stars.  And this then would be 
tantamount to undermining responsibility in which we ask of agents the best that they might rise 
to and express in their acts.  The nurturing of responsibility does require that we call for the 
agent to have available in some significant way (and then to act on) reasons the agent could 
defend.  Nurturing responsibility demands that we call for acts that are legitimate in a way 
personal to, or reflecting the virtues of, the agent who restricts action to reasons he or she might 
grasp and defend when called upon to do so.  The nurture of responsibility calls for a practice of 
expectations consonant with real accountability for acting legitimately.  But note that this 
personal, or virtue reading of legitimacy does not even call for the agent to actually possess or to 
appropriately think through every act so that it expresses reflectively held, defensible reasons. 
 If we grant my point concerning responsibility, we would do well not to suit our notion 
of legitimacy in action to what the agent has thought through and is ready to support with even 
less than ideally defensible reasons for doing.  In the first place, sometimes agents have already 
thought carefully about previous cases which appear analogous to some case now calling for 
choice and action.  No more reflection might be appropriate or called for since it could only lead 
to the same decision or to indecision growing out of fear of having missed something important.  
Further, there might not be time to reflect or the circumstances might be so strange, so taxing, or 
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so emotionally overwhelming that reflection could not be regarded as appropriate.  Or again the 
circumstances, including the ethical conflicts at hand, might be so complex as to not lend 
themselves easily to a simple statement of defensible reasons for acting one way or another—
perhaps a complex narrative is the only possibility here.  Fourth, the agent might well have been 
alert to appropriate reasons and possible problems bearing on the various open choices and 
actions, but not have been aware of this.  The agent’s act would have been influenced by reasons 
but not ones consciously considered in reflection prior to the act.  And finally, an agent’s act 
might not have been influenced by particular defensible reasons that would support some act or 
choice or belief, reasons held and at work pre-consciously, but rather the agent might have acted 
in such a way that this person could (perhaps with some assistance as in a context of 
accountability) identify and provide such reasons, and this possibility was itself what made the 
act legitimate.  Sometimes when we act with “our heart in the right place” we actually do get it 
right.  And ideally, the critically or ethically virtuous agent can act in a way that is shown to be 
personally legitimate only later even though it was not supported, even pre-consciously, by 
reasons at the time.  The critically and ethically virtuous agent should be capable of carrying on 
in a critical or ethical way, even beyond what defensible reasons this person has already in some 
repertoire capable of guiding action.  Sometimes the responsible person will do what is not only 
abstractly legitimate but is also personally legitimate and yet this agent is just responding to 
discriminations not yet articulated as reasons and operating either consciously or preconsciously.  
Sometimes the responsible agent just knows what to do, as we say, and yet has no way to explain 
this or to express why what was done was the right thing to do.  Sometimes holding someone to 
account is the occasion for that agent to articulate for the first time reasons that were not just out 
of conscious sight in action, but were actually not formed and operating as such.  Is this so 
surprising if our acts and their reasons express the connections in our brain and these connections 
might operate without our having articulated the reasons associated with that operation? (I do not 
mean to seem mysterious here.  One explanation of this possibility can be found in Alicia 
Juarrero’s dynamic complexity theory of the physical processes of having intentions and having 
reasons.  See Juarrero, 2002.)  This is only what responsibility requires of us, namely that we 
should not only act for legitimate reasons, but that we should sort things through to form these 
reasons ourselves—whether this means making others’ reasons our own, or thinking on our own 
against the grain, and until we have done so we do not actually personally possess reasons to act 
(believe) as responsible agents (or thinkers)—though we might still act responsibly with and for 
personally defensible reasons. 
Reflection and deliberation, as many have tended to speak of them, are treated as 
something we do consciously and while looking over our own shoulder, if not under the careful 
scrutiny of others interested in the outcome. (See, for example Bergson, 1910.)  But still, it 
seems that to some extent, our choices and undertakings are under the influence of careful, 
supportable discriminations, perhaps made as part of the experiential discriminations we make—
so that we see or hear or more generally experience or are aware as if in terms of the differences 
that reasons might single out and express, and thus our choices and undertakings are informed by 
a (possibly vast) knowledge of relevant and defensible reasons, even though we are not aware of 
these influences, even though we might have a hard time and need assistance in sorting them 
through and calling them to consciousness, and even though in some cases there is nothing that 
we have articulated for ourselves (indeed, being held to account might be the occasion of first 
articulating or making for ourselves or others such a reason) and that might be operating as a 
particular reason or the stuff of a particular reason guiding our action.  (For hints, implications 
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and alternative developments of such a possibility, see Raz, 2000 and Hookway 2000 on 
passivity and spontaneity in ethical experience as found in the Dancy collection, as well as 
Wittgenstein 1965 on carrying on, and McDowell 1996 on passivity and conceptual spontaneity 
united in the given of experience—though not articulated as such, Bradley 1994 on truth and 
coherence and on our knowledge of immediate experience, Bergson 1991.) 
So the critical thinker or the ethically virtuous agent might well act for reasons but not 
reflectively (and not even with the ability to alone or without the assistance of discussion and 
criticism) retrieve or even form just those reasons in the terms in which his or her undertakings 
would be defensible by reasons for an action.  Still, if an agent simply could not subject a 
prospective undertaking to review with an eye to articulating and assessing the prospect in terms 
of relevant and defensible reasons, not even in psychologically and socially favorable 
circumstances (say the circumstances of an open and nonthreatening or supportive process of 
being held to account), our practice would be to withhold normative expectations from this 
agent.  As in the law we might withhold trial and the other retrospective expressions of 
normative expectation if there is evidence the defendant could not discriminate between right 
and wrong or was in such circumstances as to preclude responding to such a discrimination no 
matter the effort expended, so in morality, if an agent is known to be not able to resist impulses 
most could withstand or is compelled to act in some way (even after a choice not to do so), or is 
sure to have some other exculpating excuse, we would not express a normative expectation by 
holding that person to account.  We want our practice of expectations to allow for an agent to be 
a virtuous thinker, either critical or ethical, and for this to be a guiding force in action even 
though it does not take the form of conscious or reflective guidance.  And this is no more than 
what we would call for if we suited the demand of legitimacy to the possibilities of 
responsibility. 
Perhaps because of our commitment to the demands implicit in the practice of 
normativity or more basically to the practice of critical thinking, as a rule we would either 
consciously reflect on our choices and undertakings and the reasons for and against them, or pre-
consciously advert to such considerations previously developed or learned.  But the expectations 
we operate under include the fact of neither of these, only that either or both are open to us.  
Thus an expectation of personal legitimacy of choice or action, or the expectation and prospect 
of the agent being able to recognize and respond to defensible reasons seems to be one central 
feature of our practice of normativity. 
Although I cannot engage in a real discussion of these points here, still two cautions are 
necessary in light of what I have already said about legitimacy.  The first is that we must not go 
forward with the impression that legitimacy is simply a matter of bringing into agreement our 
choices and undertakings with some single well-defined and easily applied code.  There is no 
such code, of course.  And if there were it would be so rich that we would find ourselves, as we 
do virtually always, conflicted between two or more options each of which seems to have a claim 
to legitimacy for us in the present circumstances and neither of which has a clear supremacy over 
the other(s).  Legitimacy is, then, almost always a matter of which of the competing courses of 
action we might provide defensible reasons for being the preferable or the permitted one,  in light 
of all that is open to us; a matter of which option has the most or the best reasons in its favor in 
the face of the conflict. 
Secondly, legitimacy is never simply a matter of bringing our choices and undertakings 
into agreement with some well-defined and easily applied code(s).  Legitimacy is a feature of 
agency in which the agent has reviewed or could review the circumstances present, recognize(d) 
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normative saliencies within these circumstances, articulate(d) these in a way that engages pre-
existing normative thought and its reasons for the sorts of action open now, and so engages what 
is at least apparently salient in terms of commitments, desires and expectations imposed by self 
and others present in the circumstances (that is, engages the contextually emergent reasons for 
acting one way or another), and then forms a judgment of what is defensible or of what is best to 
do.4
Legitimacy is, then, not algorithmic or calculative, but rather synthetic or constructive.  
Whether we are speaking of the legitimacy of belief, decision, or action under the auspices of 
critical thought, or more specifically of the rightness or best practice of choice and action under 
the guidance of ethics, legitimacy is a matter of performing well in interpreting and then putting 
together the meaning and significance of our circumstances and judging what belief, or action 
(usually from among several conflicting options) is called for in light of both those 
circumstances and the expectations upon us.  Legitimacy is then expressed in all those various 
aspects in virtue of which we have performed well in acting on defensible reasons, or, expressed 
in all those features in virtue of which had we been reflective about our undertaking, we would 
have performed well, namely, the defensibility of the reasons we could have adverted to and the 
skill or adeptness we could have expressed as we responded to our circumstances in the face of 
the expectations upon us.5  To the extent that those reasons would be marked as defensible or are 
defensible, and to the extent that we are adroit in our work of responding, our conduct would be 
normatively (personally) legitimate as called for by the expectations of responsible agency.6
 A second dimension of normativity is that of the authority of the agent, and of those with 
whom the agent might knowingly interact or otherwise become entangled.   And while I must be 
more brief here than with respect to legitimacy, I need to make a few remarks. Authority might 
be said to amount to being in a position to initiate and articulate determinations of what is 
legitimate and to make demands upon self and others accordingly.  Thus normative authority is 
inseparable from normative authoritativeness.  But what puts us in a position to identify the 
legitimate and demand this of self and others?  Analyses of authority in terms of expertise are 
well known and pertinent here.  But they are not the only dimension of authority I am concerned 
with.  Indeed, we can say that the practice of normativity credits as authoritative those who are 
able to grasp the legitimate and to use it as a guide to action.  But appearances deceive 
sometimes and not everyone who might seem to meet that expectation really does, even though 
(perhaps wrongly then) they are accorded authority.  And there are false negatives here as well as 
false positives.  Some who are accorded authority lack it for being out of touch with the 
legitimate. And some who are in touch with the legitimate are not accorded authority even 
though they should be.  This is the case of an ethical reformer before the social circumstances are 
prepared for reform.  Do we say that a reformer has no authority?  Or do we say that the agent 
has authority but was not accorded such?  Surely the latter. 
But then does being accorded authority form no part of having authority?  The question is 
in part analogous to whether we should say that an agent’s act is legitimate if that agent does not 
now possess consciously or even preconsciously defensible reasons for the act?  Agency in the 
real world must be allowed to move forward only in the face of the ability to come up with 
appropriate reasons.  So too authority.  And yet in both cases we must determine whether the 
claimant is one we could endorse.  We might have to hold the agent to account to test for that 
person’s ability to support an act with good reasons.  Just because having authority is being in a 
position to demand action or noninterference from self or others by virtue of having good 
reasons to act, we might have to hold a claimant of authority to account and test for whether this 
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person really is in touch with the legitimate.  Thus, just as personal (as opposed to abstract) 
legitimacy requires of the agent the ability to provide good reasons for the act, so also personal 
(as opposed to abstract) authority requires of the holder the ability to show a grasp of, or the 
possession of qualifications of one who can grasp, the legitimate. And since these things are not 
worn on the agent’s sleeve, we might have to check whether that person is worthy of our 
endorsement as acting legitimately or as having ethical or critical authority.  And yet with good 
reason our practice of normativity does not proceed by holding every agent to account before 
every act any more than it calls for us to test every prospective or accomplished agent for 
appropriate ethical or critical authority.  We live with ourselves and others not on the basis of our 
having legitimacy and authority, but on the basis of our normally being accorded such, and in the 
recognition that there is provision for checking on that if there is some reason to do so.  
Defeasibly, and normally in an open, free, and stable society, agents are accorded authority and 
thus also afforded a grasp of the legitimate and then access to good reasons, in place of our 
testing those persons.  Thus in practice, there is another element of possessing authority (and 
legitimacy) among some agents at least, namely being accorded a presumption of authority (or 
legitimacy) by self or others.  What does this amount to?  Setting aside the search for the test of 
someone’s personal grasp and use of the legitimate, or assuming that test met or else claimed to 
be met, what is it to accord authority (rightly or wrongly, then) to self or others?  That is the 
question I want to get to here, however briefly.7  This aspect of the social reality of authority can 
be approached through some work on the nature of authority itself.  For example, we might turn 
quickly to Christine Korsgaard and Peter Railton: 
 
Reasons are relational because reason is a normative notion:  to say that R is a reason for 
A is to say that one should do A because of R; and this requires two, a legislator to lay it 
down and a citizen to obey.  And the relation between them is not just causal because the 
citizen can disobey:  there must be a possibility of irrationality—or wrongdoing. Since it 





Reflection has the power to compel obedience and to punish us for disobedience.  It in 
turn is bound to govern us by laws that are good.  Together these facts yield the 
conclusion that the relation of the thinking self to the acting self is the relation of 
legitimate authority. That is to say, the necessity of acting in the light of reflection makes 
us authorities over ourselves.  And insofar as we have authority over ourselves, we can 
make laws for ourselves, and those laws will be normative.  So Kant’s view is also true.  
Autonomy is the source of obligation (Korsgaard 1996. 165). 
 
At the bottom of morality’s normative authority, then, Kant speaks not of an analytic 
demand of consistency nor a willful exercise of our capacity to govern ourselves by rules, 
but of an experienced synthetic demand and a free acknowledgement, the subjective 
expression of which is a feeling of a more aesthetic character, akin to the demand upon us 
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And 
 
Our moral understanding, like our aesthetic understanding, will be communicable to 
others in the form of a recommendation, and it will afford a compelling ground for life 
together that conflicting individual interests do not.  The compulsion here is not at bottom 
that of will, or law, or rule, or consistency.  Instead, it is a kind of liking that is free but 
not simply chosen, and that is regulative for action.  It is, then, our attitude when we are 
“mentally attuned” by reason, and no mere submission–even though we precisely 
recognize that it is not simply up to us what we make of it.  This is the experience of 
normative authority (Railton 2000. 27-28. My emphasis). 
 
The tradition represented here is obviously one emanating from Kant, nevertheless, it 
seems generally representative.8  On this view, the person with authority is, by virtue of having 
access to the legitimate, in a position to make demands in the name of the legitimate.  That 
person is a legislator over self and others (at least defeasibly so).  Self and others are in a position 
of being subject to the demands of reason as identified and articulated by the authority.  That is 
the first point—to accord authority is to subject oneself to the (presumed) legitimacy of the 
demands of another just because of the legitimacy of those demands.  Those who have this 
position of authority have it by virtue of self or others having taken up a special attitude toward 
that person or a special regard of the authority.  This grant is, as Railton suggests, free in that it is 
not something which reason will produce in us.  The grant is a matter of commitment to treat the 
authority as being in possession of the legitimate, based on less than direct evidence of the 
powers of the authority to grasp the legitimate.  This is especially clear in those cases where the 
authority is identified, presumptively, without any test or without being held to account in the 
matter of that authority’s judgment of the legitimate.  In that sort of case, the authority might not 
have at the ready an account of the good reasons for one or another option of action.  After all, 
the authority’s grasp of the legitimate must be that of someone who has access to personal 
legitimacy, not abstract legitimacy.  But the same point is clear even in those cases where the 
authority stands up to appropriate testing.  After all, testing for authority would never go so far as 
to establish the person’s grasp of the legitimate in the case at hand by independently identifying 
the legitimate and then seeing if the authority got it right.  The point of testing the authority is to 
test that person’s powers of judgment or to check for reason to have faith in those powers, not to 
test the accuracy of a particular judgment. (If it were the latter then we would need no authority 
in those cases where we need to test for authority.  We would just proceed to identify the 
legitimate directly and that would end the matter for us.) 
Thus in granting authority we move beyond strict evidence for someone having a grasp of 
the legitimate.  The grant is, as Railton puts it, a free acknowledgement or liking, or perhaps 
better a free acceptance of the authority as an interpreter of the legitimate.  As such, granting 
authority is granting permission to identify the legitimate and accordingly make demands on self 
and others—at least demands of noninterference with the authority acting as is legitimate, or 
demands of noninterference with another doing so, as appropriate.  Thus self and others have 
given to the authority a grant of recognition as someone with the standing that comes from being 
in touch with the legitimate, and, self and others stand ready not to interfere with the undertaking 
of the legitimate or at least stand ready to give an accounting of such interference seeking to 
show why such interference was justified or excused.  And then, my being under an expectation 
attributable to there being a reason for acting is, other things being equal, correlative with my 
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being an authority with respect to acting that way, an authority over others, as they act in ways 
that might interfere with my beliefs or undertakings.  And presumably the same is true of all 
others who have reasons to act (or believe) and thus have authority with respect to still others 
and to myself. 
Once again then, the social reality of authority in societies which are open, free, and 
stable shows the operation of a defeasible presumption of authority generated on the part of 
every agent.  This seems necessary to agents having the responsibility to identify and act on the 
demands of the legitimate, and seems necessary to the consequence of that responsibility, namely 
that agents be enabled and then empowered to sort things through on their own as ethical and 
critical agents.  This is the agential expression of the constructive dimension of critical thinking.  
Though this presumption can be withdrawn for good reasons (nonage, a hearing of 
incompetence, a record of felonious behavior, a record of moral untrustworthiness, contextual 
signs of irresponsibility), still the efficient maintenance of the social reality, and the regard, or 
trust needed for the social capital underlying the practice of normativity seem to call for this 
presumption as a rule.  Thus normativity does not just include authority; it includes the 
presumption of authority in a mutual and more or less pervasive grant of a kind of basic 
normative personal authority.9,10
 Authority then goes beyond legitimacy, though legitimacy is necessary to authority and 
so authority implies legitimacy.  (Authority does not constitute legitimacy on all theories, but as 
Korsgaard suggests, it might do so on some.)  And, if legitimacy of the reasons we have or if 
having legitimacy within our grasp were not to put us in the position of having some degree of 
(abstract and, in a well ordered society, also personal) authority as agents and belief holders, then 
we would question the status of that legitimacy.  Indeed the recognition of being in touch with 
legitimacy would most normally be through the granting of authority.  Thus even though neither 
authority nor legitimacy constitutes the other, they seem to be co-implicated with each other.  A 
story of legitimacy in which authority had no part would be seriously weakened by that, and 
conversely.  One consequence of this point is the following.  Accounts of normativity might 
concentrate upon the abstract legitimacy of reasons and understand that further in terms of 
evidentiary relations between reasons and the conclusion of the justifiedness of belief or action.  
The points just made about personal authority (and personal legitimacy) do not impugn these 
investigations, but they do urge that evidentiary investigations of normativity are narrowly 
focused and incomplete in themselves.11  Indeed, the point is that normativity as a social reality 
seems to be a complex of features of a particular form of agency among others, not a matter of 
justificatory or other epistemic relations supporting a belief or a claim of what action is justified.  
And this suggests one other dimension of normativity, namely that of salience. 
 Salience of the sort I am speaking of now amounts to the felt importance of some line of 
action, or state or feature of things or persons.12  To have salience, the opportunity to perform 
the act would stand out as significant, or the thing or person would stand out as significant in 
virtue of its state or features.  Salience will be positive or negative, will have a positive or 
negative valence, and would then be associated respectively with some motivation or impulse to 
perform or avoid performing the salient act, some motivation or impulse to realize or prevent the 
salient state, or to support or oppose the salient individual.  The dynamics of salience in critical 
and ethical agency are made complex by the number of different acts that might be salient at 
once, the number of different ways in which or reasons for which they might be salient, and the 
number of different sorts of conflicts (for example, between different sorts of ethical concerns, 
and between different sorts and sets of norms both instrumental and substantive) that might arise.  
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(See, for example, Gibbard 1990. Chaps. 10, 11, 13.)  These complexities are beyond the scope 
of this discussion.13  Still the relations between salience, legitimacy and authority deserve some 
brief comment. 
Normativity is intended as a practice for those who have undertaken to guide their actions 
and beliefs among other agents who are capable of doing the same, at least in part by good or 
defensible reasons, as opposed to force through physical influence, guile and manipulation, or 
deception.  As such, normativity is a practice aimed at involving agents in the identification of 
and adverting to reasons for acting.  It is not addressed to those who would side-step or subvert 
the guidance of reason.  Thus normativity presupposes a commitment to acting on good reasons.  
And as we engage in the practice, if we find that someone seems not to satisfy this 
presupposition, we seek to learn why and accordingly either lower our expectations and try to 
enable the agent if that agent is incompetent, or, seek to protect the system of reasons and those 
committed to it from any harm from the agent who is competent but lacks the commitment and 
so does not express it.14  Thus, normally, the presupposition of a commitment to act on good 
reasons will be expressed by those incorporated into the practice of normativity.  For such agents 
legitimacy will have primary salience, being a pervasive and life characterizing influence no 
matter how well these agents live by it.  Such agents will seek not only to live by adverting to 
good reasons, they will also seek to enable themselves to do so and will seek social 
circumstances in which living this way with others is favored.  Since one large aspect of such 
circumstances is the social capital gained through the exchange of grants of authority among 
those committed to and presumed to have a grasp on the legitimate, these agents will stand ready 
to grant authority to others striving to live by good reasons and will seek to have these others 
grant them authority in the construction, maintenance, and sustaining of a reciprocity constituting 
a commons of living according to good reasons.  Such agents will seek to make of their various 
personal lives a social whole of which they are, individually, both a contributing and a 
constrained member.  Thus, within the practice of normativity, the presupposition of a 
commitment to a life according to good reasons will link both legitimacy and authority in 
general, and in particular acts, with salience, so that personal legitimacy and authority of an act 
will bring with them a personal salience shared by the agent and those with whom the agent 
makes a commons of good reasons.  Once again there is much here that needs further attention.  
However, our current purposes will be served if I say no more than I have of the connection of 
legitimacy and authority to salience. 
The larger concern of this discussion lies in the other direction—the connection of 
salience to legitimacy and authority.  Under what conditions will the personal felt importance of 
an act (or belief) to an agent be sufficient for the legitimacy of that act (or belief)?  And under 
what circumstances might salience of belief or act lead to authority for the agent of that belief or 
act?  Of this second question, that of salience and authority I can say no more directly, at this 
point.  The remainder of this discussion will be devoted to the issue of when or under what 
conditions might salience of a belief or act ensure its legitimacy.  Many have explored this 
question.15  And so there are many points of engagement for the issue.  Many agree that since our 
acts or beliefs hold some, or sole, or the highest salience for us personally, they have some claim 
to legitimacy. (For example, some egoists would say this, and again see Korsgaard, for example.)   
And so there is no lack of endorsement or even apparent plausibility for the view.  We might find 
it profitable then to take this view seriously. But instead of approaching the matter directly 
through what others have contended, I prefer to approach it through attention to what must surely 
seem a major drawback to holding any version of a view according to which salience ensures 
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legitimacy—no matter how we constrain the salience, namely, it seems likely that we will fail to 
rid ourselves of epistemically or practically debilitating conflicts. 
Different individuals, different groups, or different concerns (no matter how widely 
shared) possessing different saliencies likely will enter into conflicts that will promise to 
undermine the appeal of saying that salience (appropriately constrained) will ensure legitimacy, 
that the felt importance of believing or acting will ensure legitimacy.  The problem is that if there 
are irresolvable conflicts over whose salience to valorize, then we might not know of at least two 
suitably opposed beliefs or acts which to mark as legitimate, or we shall be stuck with the 
outcome of marking both as legitimate in spite of their conflict.  The price of letting salience 
ensure legitimacy in spite of the dangers of deep disagreements will be the price of contradiction, 
incoherence or being bogged down in some sort of impossibility of agency.16  And that is surely 
too high a price to pay. 
Let me take up the connection of salience to legitimacy with an eye to this possibility of 
deep disagreements, first with respect to critical thinking and legitimate beliefs.  Having 
proposed in that case that we might well make good sense of salience ensuring legitimacy of 
belief, I will then extend that proposal to the case of legitimate acts.  In doing so I will seek to 




Section II. The Spirit of Critical Thinking 
 
 The sorts of conflicts of interest here are those in which each of two single or sets of 
beliefs or choices of action seem to equally enjoy support of reasons counted as defensible from 
within some epistemic paradigm and perspective or, as I would prefer to say, from within some 
community of discussion, and yet these perspectives or communities are (however coherent in 
themselves) isolated from each other so that in some crucial way they differ with the result that 
what is justified in one is not justified in the other and conversely, and what marks a belief or act 
as justified in the one differs from what does so in another, and this difference is irresolvable—it 
cannot be made up by amending the particulars of one or the other perspective without 
substantive epistemic or normative loss.17
For example, for many neurologists the central disorder they seek to find and treat is 
epilepsy.  Their testing equipment and its standard uses as well as the interpretations of results 
specify a set of possibilities in terms of the rules of inference or argument trees for diagnosis 
based on EEG and behavioral data, and rules for identifying a drug therapy regimen and for 
titrating the prescriptions so as to effectively treat these possible disorders.  But other neurally 
based disorders (for example, mitochondrial cytopathies with motor disorders) partially 
mimicking those expressed in the epilepsy lab do not fit the patterns and paradigms defining 
possible epileptic disorders, diagnosis techniques and treatment regimens.  Among neurologists 
then there are two conflicting tendencies, one to call these anomalous disorders neurological and 
expand the range of relevant possibilities, and the other to not do so.  What is the case with 
respect to these disorders?  Here are the seeds of a deep disagreement. 
Or once again an internecine conflict shows up for example among the Amish who share 
certain sacred texts (the Bible and their historical book of martyrs) but who interpret these and 
their lessons for everyday life differently and even sanctify these different interpretations in 
differences between opposed practical codes (the Ordnung).  Thus we have a group splintering 
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off so that its members might have pockets on their work aprons, while those from whom they 
fragmented mark their preferences, their salience in pockets, as proud and contrary to religious 
calling, even to the point of calling for the offenders’ excommunication and at least to the point 
of refusing membership in the more traditional of the churches (or groups) they represent. 
Or again, among some religions some or all contemporary medical treatments are 
forbidden not as some how unsanctified, but as confused and opposed to the bases of the 
religion.  Thus Christian Science sees medical disorders as really a kind of failure to maintain the 
proper religious perspective and attitude, calling for prayer and added fervor of belief, whereas 
physicians and also representatives of the law see  them as physical maladies calling for various 
sorts of interventions ranging from dietary changes to chemo- or nuclear therapeutic regimens, to 
surgeries. 
Within these examples and others like them, which of the conflicting belief and 
prescription sets is preferable?  When each belief and practice is fully embedded in its 
background beliefs and developed against differences of definition of key terms such as 
“neurological disorder,” “pride,” and “health,” the question perhaps is moot, or at the least the 
way we are to resolve these differences must take us beyond the stands for knowing and doing 
that operate within each of the conflicting perspectives.  We seem to lack any clear way to 
legitimate one or the other of the opposing saliencies. 
 But where are we to find means to deal adequately and defensibly with these conflicts 
emanating from different saliencies?  To get some idea of one way to approach that problem we 
need to know more about how the conflicts come up.  There are four general features of being a 
critical thinker within a particular perspective which demand our attention in this connection.  
First, any perspective common to those seeking good reasons to believe or to act defensibly in 
some domain of concerns or with respect to some set of problems will call upon individuals to 
practice inquiry in certain ways.  The perspective will offer a set of background assumptions 
about what exists, about how it acts and interacts, and about its significance.  This background 
knowledge defines a set of possibilities which might be realized and are of interest to those 
seeking to guide belief and action about relevant matters by reference to good reasons.  But these 
possibilities only say what might be and the thinker or agent is interested in what is.  Thus in 
addition to a domain of common problems and a set of background beliefs about things setting 
the stage of that domain, those operating within a particular perspective will share some set of 
procedures for testing to see which of the possibilities of interest is realized here and now, and a 
set of procedures to determine what to do about that.  For the purposes of fixing belief or 
determining the defensible course of action in the circumstances, the problematic, background 
assumptions, and procedures of particular problem identification and management constitute the 
sources of a perspective’s good reasons for believing or acting in one way or another.  Norms of 
performance within the perspective call for those using it to conduct inquiry in a way adverting 
to the beliefs and paradigms of investigation of the perspective.  If there are differences between 
those of different perspectives in the norms of performance then, since these determine what 
(from within that perspective) counts as a good reason for believing or doing something, there 
will be a difference of what are good reasons between those of the differing perspectives.  And, 
each perspective will impose upon agents operating within it an expectation of integrity to guide 
belief and practice according to the norms and then the good reasons of the perspective.  How 
might we settle differences between communities of discussion or groups of inquirers 
accountable to each other for holding to such differing perspectives?  Whose integrity should be 
epistemically dominant?  An answer might be sought in asking by what means members of a 
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perspective might themselves assess the norms of performance of its inquirers?  Knowing the 
answer to that question should allow us to see if there is some way for members of the 
conflicting groups to come to some sort of agreement in accordance with a common procedure 
for identifying norms of inquiry and the reasons they support. 
Unfortunately, the standard answers do not provide what is needed. Some might claim 
self-evidence for their norms of inquiry.  But unfortunately such an appeal is notoriously 
unsatisfactory.  If it is insisted upon by a proponent of a certain perspective, then by virtue of the 
structure of the conflicts at hand this appeal is tantamount to begging the question.  But if self-
evidence is allowed to all contending parties, then there is no reasonable promise of resolution of 
the conflict. 
That promise might seem credible if we switch to the second order consideration of 
functionality, or, that is, to assessments of how well the various perspectives of the conflicting 
communities serve in providing norms of inquiry adequate to the problematic of the group; how 
well do the background assumptions and the rest serve to meet the purposes of the group of 
inquirers?  There is much to worry with here.  For example, is there some way to measure 
functionality or even subjectively so that comparisons could be made if the occasion arose as in a 
conflict of the sort we are speaking of?  But problems of strictly measuring functionality and 
other issues aside, this appeal will not be likely to help us settle conflicts between groups with 
differing norms.  In those cases where there is a different problematic in each of the conflicting 
groups, then the norms of inquiry might be equally functional, or not, and still the question 
remains where does that leave us?  For now the issue has become which set of purposes should 
our norms of inquiry serve, that of the first or that of the second conflicting community? 
To be sure we should add to the performance requirement of integrity, or, that is, the 
requirement of proceeding according to accepted intersubjective standards of inquiry and the 
requirement of making oneself accountable for objectivity in inquiry, a second kind of 
performance requirement capturing an aspect of the impartiality of thought. In particular, we 
should require of thinkers that they credit others’ beliefs as of equal standing with their own 
should these beliefs be supported by reference to the same sorts of methods as are those of their 
own.  Thus, if inquirers form beliefs of what norms to follow in seeking warranted belief, or of 
what norms to follow in seeking first order beliefs about the world or appropriate action by 
appeal to the (say freely selected) purposes served thereby, then these thinkers must also credit 
the beliefs of others when formed in the same ways, mutatis mutandis.  (I find this general point 
also in Gibbard, 1990.)  Similarly, if the inquirer relies on observation or coherence or deduction 
from self-evident truths, then mutatis mutandis, similar reliance must be respected in others. 
And, we should require of thinkers that they stand ready to examine their own beliefs and 
assumptions and be ready to change them or give them up if they are found deficient by such 
second order standards. 
These two aspects of impartiality of thought—a minimal epistemic charity and a 
readiness for self-criticism comprise a principle of respect for those who seek to live by critical 
reason.  This respect could lead us to accept the legitimacy of others’ beliefs if they had formed 
or tested their norms of inquiry, like us, on the basis of the functionality of these norms for the 
purposes their group pursues in inquiry.  The addition of this principle of charity and self-
examination would warrant our respecting and living with or tolerating those who have 
differences with us attributable to functionality.  But while this dissolves the conflict, it does not 
settle it; instead it only leaves us separated by our different problematic and should we have to 
choose between these perspectives attuned to these different purposes, we are no better off than 
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we were in just pursuing our own group integrity.  Just so, in the case of a child who will or will 
not receive treatment for an obstructed bowel, the respect for functional demands attuned to the 
different purposes of Christian Science or of modern medicine aligned with the law will not help 
us decide what is the best treatment for the child and what is the apt or the correct view of the 
health of the child.  Furthermore, there is always a conflict between respect and integrity 
(between self and other respect) in a single thinker or agent.  The question continuously is how to 
balance these.  And functionality does not help us understand how we might properly strike a 
balance between these virtues of critical reasoning.  Functionality, as well as respect in the form 
of charity and a readiness of self-examination are demands appropriate to saliencies that would 
lead to beliefs or acts that are legitimate.  But they cannot tell the whole story any more than can 
an appeal to integrity. 
Things are no better when we switch to communities which share some overall purpose 
and understanding of the sorts of problems their members will pursue through inquiry.  The case 
of the quarreling Amish and the disagreeing neurologists are cases in point.  Here the common 
problematics and purposes of inquiry serve only to exacerbate the problems since there is no 
common and consistent set of norms identifying either what particular circumstances will count 
symptoms as problematic or what will provide a solution to identified problems.  Is having 
pockets on one’s work apron proud or not?  Does a malady which presents as a disconnect 
between EEG measurable patterns and behavior indicate a neurological problem within the 
domain of neurology, or not?  In both cases whether the inquirers are confronted with a problem 
within their ken and whether they have a solution are the issues that the examples bring up.  No 
amount of appeals to self-evidence will settle these questions.  And the commonality of a 
problematic with an account of reasons that is functional for that is of no avail here.  So, 
something more is needed now to resolve such conflicts within a single problematic (broadly 
construed) and between means for identifying and managing problems. 
The case of the neurologists brings into play another factor in decisions between 
candidates for second level epistemic principles or norms of inquiry which guide us in 
articulating standards for belief and which in effect identify saliencies of beliefs that are 
legitimate.  The neurologists might well fall back on their “tried and true” technology and the 
paradigms of diagnosis tied up with these.  “Surely the EEGs and their well known patterns can 
recognize any real problem of the sort that we neurologists can deal with!”  Such an appeal 
would be to what might be called the logicality or the algorithmic patterns of reasoning involved 
in a perspective in so far as it identifies and manages problems of the relevant sort.  But of course 
any such appeal would be immediately suspect in resolving conflicts between the traditional 
neurologists and their detractors.  After all, the question is whether their norms of inquiry are 
right in sanctioning the use of the EEG as the only or the primary diagnostic tool capable of 
ruling in or ruling out a certain partial range of possible neurological disorders.   Paradigms such 
as the use of EEGs and behavioral monitoring to spot what kind of neurological disorder is 
present in various patients must not be used beyond their scope and in a conflict of the sort 
described here; the extent of that scope is the very question at issue.  Thus, appeals to logicality 
at that level are not settled by such appeals, rather they are only entrenched by such appeals.  To 
be sure, logicality is a requirement coming out of but exceeding the requirement of integrity.  
Since the patterns of reasoning that are called for include those of logic, then logicality goes 
beyond integrity to be a wholly separate requirement of all perspectives that might generate 
legitimate beliefs.  So, such generalized logicality is a second order requirement beyond that of 
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functionality, and beyond the performance requirements of integrity and respect for other 
thinkers. 
That said, the addition of logicality will cause us further difficulties when we recognize 
one other second order requirement of thought generating beliefs with a defensible claim to 
legitimacy.   In the case of the quarreling Amish there is a shared problematic—how to live well 
in the Amish way, and in accordance with the Bible and The Book of Martyrs.  But there is  a 
dispute over how to limit the grant of empowerment to construct meaning and arguments that we 
must grant to every critical reasoner; namely, in this case a dispute over how to limit the grant of 
empowerment allowing individuals the space or authority to construct interpretations of these 
common texts as they apply to everyday life.  Whether pockets are proud or not to have on one’s 
work apron is not something we can look to the books for a literal reading on and so 
interpretation and application is called for.  But then whose interpretation, whose reading?  
Tradition would leave us with no pockets.  An alternative reading would leave us with pockets of 
fragmentation and disharmony.  Critical thought being constructive, as noted above, calls for a 
certain amount of empowerment to make such interpretations, for a certain amount of authority 
and then for the granting of that to have salience for all in the community in question, if not 
beyond.  But how much?  There is no obvious answer, none that is not worked out in practice in 
the give and take of articulating and enforcing norms of inquiry.  But that is the problem.  For the 
more traditional Amish in the dispute there is no give and take to be allowed on the matter. 
Appealing to integrity or respect does not help.  These only tell us that in inquiry we are 
to hew close to the line of the group, and yet we are to be self-critical and not hypocritical or 
otherwise inconsistent or question begging in faulting other’s thinking.  These requirements of 
performance are not helpful here, calling as they do for the norms of inquiry that would define 
the group lines and the need for charity and self-criticism.  And when we move to other concerns 
we are to meet as we articulate and negotiate our first level norms of inquiry, the concerns of 
functionality and logicality, these are no help in telling us how to construct the second level 
concern for empowerment.  Indeed, a call for empowerment works against a call for logicality 
and challenges the traditions of interpretation of the group’s problematic in ways that might 
redefine just what is functional for inquiry in the group.  Thus we seem to have only another or a 
second layer of concerns in need of balancing if we are to identify good reasons for believing 
something.  And then we have only a second set of problems to address as we seek to articulate 
the constraints on salience that would lead us to adopt defensible second level norms for guiding 
inquiry.  Empowerment is properly salient as is functionality and logicality. But how much and 
in what forms, remain the questions before us.  And with these questions the conflicts remain. 
One last resort remains open to us.  If we are not to limit apriori the “contents, 
procedures, strategies, purposes and practitioners of thought,” we must seek to constrain first 
order norms of the performance of inquiry and second order norms of the articulation and 
maintenance of those first level norms only by reference to whether their adoption will serve the 
sustained flourishing of critical thought.  What medical interventions or tolerances would best 
serve the child of the Christian Scientist and the faithful, and the others in a shared society in so 
far as they are critical reasoners?  What extension or limitation of neurology would best serve 
that field of medicine and science and its patients in so far as it is a field of critical inquiry?  
What allowances of interpretation of the texts and teaching of Amman would best serve the 
disputing Amish in the endeavor of guiding their lives by reason?  And, in every case, what 
construction of the social circumstances and what damping of the social impact of the practice of 
communities of discussion would best serve the sustained flourishing of critical thought 
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throughout societies?  These are not factual questions.  Instead, to draw on my earlier discussion 
of this point, I would say that the task is one of striking a number of appropriate balances in 
society, creating the circumstances of the flourishing of critical thought overall.  And, “the task 
of striking those balances is really a matter of sustaining a number of conversational 
constructions each of which constitutes the uneasy co-existence of competing communities and 
the totality of which constitutes the blending of our lives as critical thinkers into the receding 
horizons of [our shared] future” (Blatz 1997. 49). 
  There are general attitudes and concerns and expectations we need to have as dominant 
in so far as we are critical thinkers, concerns for such issues as our group’s problematic and for 
integrity in dealing with it, attitudes such as respect, expectations such as functionality, logicality 
and empowerment, all wrapped in an overriding concern for the sustained flourishing of critical 
thought. (And there are concerns particular to the various communities in which we visit or 
participate as members.  See Blatz 1997.)  To the extent that these are taken to heart, and inform 
what is marked as salient in the thought—either reflective or in the thought of the pre-conscious 
experience of an agent, they imbue that thought with what might be called the spirit of critical 
thinking.  Thus we might say that salience felt in the spirit of critical thinking (and acted upon in 
inquiry) ensures legitimacy of belief.  There are, it seems then, a number of virtues of critical 
thought that will by their presence and influence ensure legitimacy of belief.  Might the same be 
said for salience bearing on the legitimacy of action?  If legitimacy in ethical thinking were one 
form of critical thought, then it would seem that the answer to this question is, yes.  But is this 
so?  Or rather, is legitimacy in ethical thinking restricted or constrained by legitimacy in critical 
thinking?  And if it is, what more is distinctive about thought generating good reasons for acting 
among others in some way or another?  I want to turn to the first of these two questions now and 
I will conclude with some brief remarks on the second. 
 
 
Section III. Salience, Impartiality, Legitimacy of Belief, and Legitimacy of Action 
 
One key connection between legitimacy of thought and legitimacy of action is found in 
the notion of impartiality.  Impartiality among ethical agents arguably supplies a large part of the 
core of normativity—the legitimacy and authority of the ethical guides we articulate and use to 
direct or constrain our actions.  Of course, the notion of impartiality is implicated with ethical 
normativity in a number of interconnected ways.  In the interest of just moving to a brief 
consideration of what are perhaps the most central of these dimensions of impartiality, let me 
first suggest a list.  Impartiality comprises at least: 
 
1) an insistence upon some appropriate kind of universality of norms— 
impartiality in the scope of legitimate norms and normative considerations  
2) a tendency toward appropriate equality of treatment—impartiality in the 
respect with which we respond to self and others 
3) an apt uniformity in expectations of thought and performance—impartiality in 
making demands of self and others 
4) an attitude supporting the meeting of agents on their own terms and thus without 
prejudgment—impartiality in the response to agents with standing 
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5) a tendency to consider ethical questions in each case on their own merits and alone in 
terms of the saliencies present—impartiality in the basis of ethical problems and their 
solution 
6) and a readiness to grant authority and deference due to agents because of their ethical 
standing—impartiality in the recognition of ethical agents as having standing. 
 
This characterization of some dimensions of impartiality will be sharpened up below, but 
can serve to stimulate our intuitive grasp of impartiality as a matter of the relations between 
agents sharing, through the exchange of reasons, the space in which they exercise their choice.  
What is the relation of the desired features of critical thinkers to impartiality of this sort?  
To live within the spirit of critical thinking is to express and conscientiously maintain certain 
limitations on thought and action.  These include:  a form of epistemic integrity, a form of 
respect including a readiness for self-criticism and a form of epistemic charity.  To think with a 
commitment to integrity and respect will lead us toward an acceptance of accountability for the 
purposes, methods, and particular uses of thought in agency (integrity of thought guiding 
agency), and an acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of our thought in agency 
(integrity and respect of thought guiding agency).  In addition, our concern for the self-criticism 
and for the sustained flourishing of critical thinking will carry over to the domain of agency as an 
openness or readiness to include all thinkers within the scope of our integrity, charity, 
accountability and responsibility.  And that same concern for the sustained flourishing, as well as 
the reciprocal nature of standing and authority, will support an expectation of all thinkers that 
they will operate with the same concerns, and with a readiness to pursue harmony or accord with 
those who are seeking to act in ways expressing these constraints. 
Now it is not a far reach from here to ethical impartiality.  A review of these implications 
of the spirit of critical thinking reveals how they might bridge that spirit to the concern with 
ethical impartiality.  Thus for each of the above listed aspects of ethical impartiality, there are 
aspects of the spirit of critical thinking which are such that their presence seems likely to ensure 
the presence of that dimension of impartiality.  And thus for each of the above we can look to the 
following to find the seeds of an argument to the effect that the sprit of critical thought will 
ensure that aspect of impartiality. 
 
1) An insistence upon some appropriate kind of universality of norms--
impartiality in the scope of legitimate norms and normative considerations: 
a) This dimension of impartiality is subject to at least three readings which we 
need to consider separately.  First, a concern with integrity and respect in 
combination with logicality will call for us to abide by principles of 
consistency and coherence in our thinking about what is called for by 
defensible norms or by good reasons.  This generates an insistence upon 
universality of norms in that norms and reasons for action will hold good for 
agents facing the same choices in the same circumstances.  Numerical 
difference between agents will not make a difference to what is ethically 
salient if it is legitimate. 
b) But as well, the universality of norms is also a personal matter of integrity of 
thought in that other things being equal it would be personally inconsistent as 
a matter of practice to mark a consideration as a good reason for an action in 
one case but not for a similar act in other similar cases.  Of course we change 
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and what might be permitted for us changes with these changes to some 
extent.  But, other things being equal, changes of occasion of choice and 
action do not by themselves change the legitimate acts open to us and it is a 
sign of integrity that we reflect this in our choices and our actions.  
c) Third, the universality of norms is also a social matter in that those in a single 
normative group or ethical community of discussion would seek common 
norms guaranteeing that the same acts are equally legitimate in the same sorts 
of circumstances.  And this is so for a number of reasons.  First are 
considerations of consistency, and secondly are considerations of group 
integrity.  But in addition, and if for no other reason, groups would seek this 
logical sort of universality in light of the fact that norms common in this way 
would provide one important mark of the boundaries of proper empowerment 
with respect to ethical thinking at a given time and within that group.  Groups 
must signal or else express the degree to which agents are empowered to 
exercise their basic normative authority concerning matters of interest to the 
group.  This can be done in many ways, for example, by the degree of 
vagueness allowed in the statement of norms and by the laxity of 
accountability procedures.  But underlying all such measures will be the 
adherence to impartiality in the sense of norms being articulated, supported 
and used as universal in the way suggested. 
2) A tendency toward appropriate equality of treatment:  However, the above is 
not all of impartiality, by any means.  Questions of distributive justice aside, 
the present aspect of impartiality focuses not on equality of position, 
opportunity, material goods, and other aspects of material justice, but rather on 
the respect and recognition due to all ethical agents from each other.  This 
respect calls for each (through the principles of charity and self-criticism, and 
operating within the concern for the sustained flourishing of critical thinking) 
to grant to others the recognition and accountability needed to function with 
some basic normative authority.  This, in combination with our responding to 
that constraint of logicality of not begging the question against opposing or 
different ethical views, will ensure others at least a minimal place in the social 
space of ethical agency.  This is certainly one fundamental aspect of a basic 
equality of treatment called for from one ethical agent to others.  But how far 
does that equality of treatment reach as an expression of impartiality?  The 
answer that is legitimate and operative at any time in any society depends upon 
a number of factors.  (See number 6 below.) 
3) An apt uniformity in expectations of thought and performance:  Consistency 
and nonquestion begginness demanded by generalized logicality and informed 
by the tendency toward equality of treatment just spoken of and along with the 
tendencies toward universality of norms within and even between groups, will 
direct us toward an apt uniformity in expectations of thought and performance 
with respect to self and others.  Still, authority and empowerment will make 
this no more than a personally and socially apt uniformity within the concern 
for the sustained flourishing of critical ethical reasoning.  And thus in context, 
this qualification will introduce differences between agents, for example, of 
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different ages, experience and skill levels, education, and resources.  (Also see 
number 1.c.) 
4) An attitude supporting the meeting of agents on their own terms and thus 
without prejudgment:  Accountability and the responsibility to subject our own 
beliefs of what is ethically defensible to criticism, when combined with charity 
toward the views of others and the recognition reciprocally due to them will 
take us to others and their acts in  such as way as to meet them on their own 
terms treating them at least presumptively as ethical authorities in a position to 
demand of us serious consideration if not acceptance of what they believe. 
5) A tendency to consider ethical questions in each case on their own merits and 
alone in terms of the saliencies present:  And thus for the reasons we would 
seek to meet self and others as ethical authorities (at least presumptively), just 
so we would tend to consider ethical questions whether raised by ourselves or 
others as possibly being authoritative or having merit to which we must accede 
through serious consideration in which we approach the agent’s views in part 
through just those saliencies that agent saw in the cases in question.  
6) And a readiness to grant authority and deference due to agents because of their 
ethical standing:  How far does the scope of the points in 2, 4 and 5 extend?  
The overriding concern for the sustained flourishing of critical thought will 
require that we remain open to engagement, on the terms of critical thinking, 
with any who is or proves to be committed to making a life together on such 
terms.  Within the space of our ethical agency this must include all those from 
whom we would seek recognition and accountability sufficient to establish us 
with the authority empowering us in our thought and action to be ethical agents 
constructing a personal future.  And it will include as well those who would 
seek authorization from us to function as agents themselves.  But further, since 
ethical agency calls for us to operate upon or act from good reasons and just 
what counts as such reasons is a social or interpersonal matter, not merely a 
personal matter, and since the community of discussion for legitimacy is 
marked off by a boundary always porous because of the requirement to remain 
open to criticism from others and oneself, then the interpersonal engagements 
we have as ethical agents acting on good reasons are theoretically limitless.  
Thus we will operate presumptively in general so as to extend to all potential 
ethical agents authority and deference as agents with standing.  In practice of 
course, these bounds are limited by practical necessity, by the boundaries of 
communities in which we are operatively, and not just abstractly or ideally, 
accountable for our acts, and by the social conditions of the institutionalization 
of the articulation and maintenance of norms as ways of seeing to the 
flourishing of critical thought.  Thus for example, the institutions giving life to 
the social conditions of the practice of law will draw those operative 
boundaries in ways different from those of economics and from those of 
morality.  Still the presumption is in favor of institutionalizing systems that are 
maximally inclusive and engaging. 
 
Thus there are such connections between living within the spirit of critical thinking and 
living an ethically impartial life that we can see that the former will ensure the latter in an 
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important range of the dimensions of ethical impartiality.  Further, then, meeting the conditions 
of living within the spirit of critical thinking will ensure that ethical agents operate within a spirit 
of ethical impartiality in the sense in question.  Those for whom salience in the domain of action 
is constrained by the spirit of critical thinking will also be agents whose saliencies in action will 
have a claim to ethical legitimacy that is attributable to their being appropriately impartial.  This 
takes the saliencies of such agents a long way toward ethical legitimacy. 
Still a long way is not necessarily the whole way.  Part of the gap as approached through 
the virtues and relationships of the ethical agent (and not through the evidentiary conditions of 
knowing the ethically legitimate) can be closed by developing an account of just what more is 
supplied epistemically by our encounters with others in the contexts of agents standing 
accountable for their ethical thinking and choices.  That inquiry will have to be taken up 
elsewhere, later.  Part of the difficulty there lies in the fact that the account of salience that I have 
given thus far is a very thin one and so it is not clear just what more goes into the ingredients of 
defensible ethical salience besides concerns of impartiality.  And, if there is more will this make 
ethical salience an expression of personal interest or in that way make ethical salience partial?  
Do we need to introduce partiality into ethical salience that is legitimate?  Or is reason alone 
capable of providing us salience that could serve to direct us in critical inquiry and in ethics?  
Can reason, in that way, be practical?  If not, then how might we introduce partiality into the 
saliencies of defensible ethical agency? 
 
 
Section IV. The Bond of Salience to Legitimacy: Reason or Commitment?  
 
The question here is a rather particular one.  I imagine that critical reasoning can in some 
crucial way determine the saliencies through which we meet the world and from which we derive 
the reasons for our actions, even when this process is part of the pre-conscious engagement of 
agents with the world in the presence of which we act.   But the question then is whether critical 
reasoning is put in this role by arguments worked out in critical reasoning—does or could critical 
reasoning bootstrap itself into the role of determining the very saliencies we are struck by in our 
engagements with the world, or is critical reason put in the position of constraining or limiting 
these saliencies only by the agent’s personal commitment or decision to act under the guidance 
of reason?18  Thus here the question is whether reason, by argument, can move us into accepting 
the constraints of seeking legitimate reasons for our action, or whether independently of 
argument we come to accept the discipline of reason (instead of the exercise of power or guile) 
as something we choose as a way of living.  Could we argue our way into following good 
reasons in our actions where ethical assessment might play a role?  Could this really be so?  
Well we cannot prove that ethics is correct by force (force proves nothing).  And we 
cannot bring someone to more than outward conformity by force (the commitment force brings is 
to avoid harm and pain, not necessarily to endorse what the forceful say or believe, even in the 
psychology of the Stockholm Syndrome).  But could reason prove that following reason is the 
best way to proceed, independently of whether it could guarantee by such a proof that we are 
motivated to live according to reason or to limit the saliencies through which we meet the world 
to what reason calls for?  That is, if someone already accepted the legitimacy of appeals to 
reasons (and so was moved to some extent to seek such reasons for what she believes or chooses 
and perhaps even to follow them once found), can we give good reasons to anyone for following 
reason in the areas of concern addressed by ethics?  Perhaps the appeal should go:  We should 
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follow reason in matters of practical concern because doing so is one case of following reason in 
general and all cases of doing that are good or right or correct?  But if we are trying to support 
following reason in the area of ethics, if that is something under contention, how could we claim 
that all cases of following reason in general are good or right—what we are trying to establish by 
reason is itself a case of following reason and doing so in general is under contention, then we 
cannot say that all cases of following reason are good or right. 
Now any more particular argument for the goodness or rightness or correctness of 
following reason presupposes the correctness of following the reasons given or following reason 
in general, and in either case it would be question begging to give reasons to prove that we 
should follow reason in the form of ethics.  It seems then that this is a choice we must make 
because it will serve our purposes as agents acting in a world of others influenced and interfered 
with by our undertakings.  Our personal agenda or our aims in our undertakings will make a 
difference to others.  And whether we intend to proceed with those undertakings so as to see to 
them by reason and in a way including deference to our entanglements with these others, or 
whether we decide to power our way through these entanglements marking others as only 
potential obstacles, is one thing that accounts for the kind of difference we will make to others.  
If our purpose comes to be one of meeting others on a ground of feeling and desire informed by 
reason, then we can explain our commitment to the spirit of critical thinking and to ethical 
impartiality as simply a commitment to the means to serve this purpose.  And even though 
reference to this commitment and the means to serving that purpose do not prove the 
commitment to critical reason is right or correct, still this rationalization makes it understandable 
that we would make the commitment to reason as our way of living.  In no case do we have a 
proof of the goodness or rightness or correctness of following reason.  And then it would seem 
that living by reasons in ethics as an expression of the use of critical reason is something we 
freely commit to, or not; it is not something we must accept because of the call of reasoning 
itself. (See again Railton 2000 on Kantian authority of reasons in ethics.) 
 
 
Section V. Partiality, Salience, Feeling and the Font of Ethics:  Supplementing Legitimacy on the 
Way to Salience in Ethical Agency 
 
Thus commitment brings legitimacy and reasons into saliency.  But how do self and 
others come into these reasons and into saliencies?  Part of the answer is that individuals bring to 
the circumstances of their action their own wants, hopes, fears, history of commitments, and 
other personal concerns which shape what has felt importance for them in those circumstances.  
But in addition to these idiosyncratically personal factors expressed in salience there are two 
other sorts of concerns which shape what felt importance the circumstances of our agency 
possess.  These are impersonal in so far as they do not express the individual history or 
undertakings of the agent.  At the same time they are not impersonal in the way the commitment 
to legitimacy is impersonal.  They are taken up by the agent as an aspect of the agent’s outlook 
and in particular they bear on the agent’s regard of others who are or who might be encountered 
in the act in question.  The first of these might be spoken of as the degree of consideration or 
accord we offer toward another as we act. Alternatively we might speak of the degree of 
engagement with others we are open to when we act.  The second form of regard toward others 
making salient their presence in our space of agency is one we bear as an expression of the type 
of ethical reasons that we are open to have constraining our action in the circumstances.  These 
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considerations of accord or degree of engagement sought with others, and considerations of 
ethical regard, when added to the personal history and agenda of the undertakings we prosecute, 
and the concern for impartiality with which we act, together provide us with a  robust sensitivity 
to the circumstances of our presence as agents among and interrelated to other agents, and thus 
equip us with the capacity to respond differentially to changes in those circumstances assigning 
to some changes a positive felt importance and to others a negative felt importance.  These 
considerations, our history, our commitment to reason’s impartiality all provide a capacity to 
respond to our circumstances in nuanced ways through personal but “other-aware” saliencies we 
find ourselves with in those circumstances.  In order to round out the account of impartiality as a 
universalizing constraint on salience, let me explain a little of how our concern for impartiality 
and our personal agenda are supplemented by these chosen and so partial, but yet common or 
general forms of regard toward others. 
 
 
Grades of Involvement with Others through Ethics: 
 
There are several different degrees of accord, or grades of involvement or engagement we 
might seek (and so be sensitive to) in action that entangles us with others.  Any one or more of 
these might serve as a source of felt importance attaching to some as opposed to other 
occurrences and to some of the possible responses we notice as agents.  Ethics have point 
because we have choices we need to think about, and these choices are the options we have in 
situations where we can make mistakes or get things wrong or have our handling of a situation 
come off well or less than optimally.  In all of these ways of going well or sour, our choices and 
the ensuing actions possibly will involve us with self or others in one or another kind of 
misadventure (either the other we would like ourselves to be or the other that we aspire to be, or 
else the other whom we come in contact with and who is a different person, a different center of 
choice).  If a choice does not involve the potential of failure in our involvement with another of 
significance –our better self, a self we are striving to be, another person, another animal or other 
living thing, then there is no ethical dimension to it.  Ethics has to do with choices involving 
others or the self considered as another.   If this were not so then ethics would apply to acts or 
ways of being which would make no difference to anyone or any being of significance.  This 
seems incoherent. 
Thus, in order to understand ethics we must see them as attached to choices involving 
others of significance.  Ethical matters will involve us with others through our choices.  These 
choices will bear on how we are with others—what sort of co-presence we strive to establish and 
maintain with these others.  What I mean is that ethical agency involves the exercise of choice in 
which we relate to others more or less closely, in one or more of a number of possible ways.  The 
barest sketch of these ways follows: 
 
• We might choose so that we affect only our co-existence with another, or so that our 
coordination with others’ actions prevents our interfering with them, though this 
involves nothing more than staying out of their way.  For example, we share the road 
with another; we live in peace obeying the laws and not interfering with others, even 
as we remain total strangers with respect to each other.  The quality of our 
relationship on these terms is only that of unintentionally coordinated but anonymous 
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co-existence.  And the affect that is appropriate to that level of engagement might be 
spoken of as mere tolerance.19 
• Or again, we might exercise our choice paying heed to others so that we achieve or 
maintain some form of harmony or mutual noninterference with them.  Here we are 
not just avoiding interference with them, but we actually become involved in a 
reciprocal relationship of at least intentional coordination that ensures 
noninterference, and perhaps we even begin to develop mutual concern.  For 
example, we share a dance floor with others, or we stand in line for the same play 
with others, or we share the road with others through adherence to a common set of 
regulations of speed, stopping and starting, counting on others to notice us and advert 
to our presence through the rules or conventions of the agency space in which we 
operate, and so on.  The quality of our relationship would be more than mere co-
existence even though we remain strangers.  The quality would be more one of 
getting along with or co-occurring or being co-present with each other.  And the 
affect that is appropriate to that level of engagement is respect. 
• If we deepen our getting along with others by virtue of including a knowledge of 
others and they of us, a knowledge that is personal to some extent, then we have come 
together and are acting (even though separately) partially in light of being in some 
relationship with particular others.  For example, we might get to know each other in 
a class, or in a research group, or a conference, and even though we do not seek each 
other’s company or come in contact with each other with any further personal interest 
outside of that space, we do there. Hence we achieve a bit closer relationship with 
those individuals in the class (etc.) than with those with whom we share the road on 
the way to class.  Here the quality of our relationship has become more than mere co-
existence and more than merely getting along.  We have some common concerns, 
some mutual knowledge of each other as individual persons.  We have come together 
in our agency, and the impact of our acts on each other as real individuals sharing 
agency space has come to be a matter of personal knowledge and concern.  We would 
look out so as to not disturb each other, but we also work with the other toward 
common ends individually lived.  And this basis of commonality and familiarity 
changes our regard toward each other.  The affect that is appropriate to that level of 
engagement is empathy. 
• But also, by investing more and acting with respect to others with more personal 
knowledge, while still not necessarily possessing great knowledge, we might shape 
our choices and act with regard to others so that we form or further a relationship of 
acting together with a common end, lived together, and so that we cluster the interests 
and projects of others with our own; perhaps we even enter a relationship in which we 
form or function as in a collective agency together. For example we take part in the 
same firm, in the same concert orchestra, we form a friendship, a marriage, or other 
joint venture and so come to know or become aware of each other personally even to 
a greater extent than we would if we had only come together in our agency, but 
remained apart as agents not bundling our interests or personal projects with those of 
the other.  Here the demands of operating within a joint venture would require that we 
achieve some degree of harmonious interaction—even if this is only with regard to 
some small and highly compartmentalized portion of our agency—such as workplace 
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behavior and the minimal concerns for harmony that go with that endeavor.  And the 
affect that is appropriate to that level of engagement is sympathy. 
• And finally, we can form our attitudes, our values, our hopes, and as well, so 
constrain our choices as to achieve some form and degree of identity with another—
we come to act not as separate individuals in a collective, but as one individual, each 
sharing with the other some of the same commitments, values, stakes, and each 
empowered to act as the other, and each benefiting and suffering from the 
consequences of action in the same ways and roughly to the same extent.  Then, in 
such a case, as agents exercising choice, we would have become one.  Thus parents 
who function as one, life partners who have been together through much and become 
devoted to each other, persons taking part as a team member wherever all have come 
to take personally the stakes and responsibilities of each other—for example members 
of a group activity with high personal stakes common for all (as in a climbing team, 
or a combat team) can achieve a quality of relationship with another agent that 
amounts to (partial) identity.   As agents exercising choice they can become one.  And 
the affect that is appropriate to that level of engagement is a feeling of identity. 
 
Which of these degrees of involvement or engagement we adopt as we become entangled 
in our agency will vary with the physical and psychological circumstance of our actions, with the 
institutions and traditions of the society in which we act, and with the degree of openness each of 
the agents is capable of—and thus with our personal approach to ethics, either agonistic or as a 
mutual enterprise of coordination and cooperation.  Not every form of entanglement is 
compatible with every level of engagement or involvement.  We do not identify or even 
empathize with those on the road with us in rush hour traffic.  Or we usually do not—if we see 
someone cut off ahead of us, or otherwise endangered, we can take that very personally and 
come to identify vicariously with that victim, or we might at least empathize, even if we do not 
and never will know that person.  We can approximate (in our feelings at any rate) a deep or 
even  the fullest degree of engagement through the other toward the third driver, even though we 
do not really become one with that other in our agency.  And, not every form of entanglement 
that is possibly a site for a variety of degrees of involvement between the individuals entangled 
will develop to have all degrees of engagement that it might.  Perhaps many marriages with 
children do not achieve that condition in which the parents become one or identified in their 
agency.  Perhaps those involved could not bring themselves to seek it out.  But then so goes one 
internal conflict localized in marriage as a setting of procreation and child rearing having co-
evolved with technology, the division of labor, and the nature of work in the industrialized north.  
 Depending upon how we select from among these degrees of accord and thereby partially 
construct our regard of others, our saliencies will differ.  And then what is to count as legitimate 
for us will have to constrain while yet being attuned to these differences.  Perhaps sympathy 
cannot be legitimately expected of us in every act with regard to just anyone. But when it would 
be a normal part of or a possible normal part of our relationship with someone, it is inappropriate 
and perhaps not legitimate ethically to act with less regard toward that other person.  Thus 
snubbing someone in public when we know her well, or failing to be solicitous of another who is 
sick and failing to do so in a way reflecting and regenerating the fact of close personal friendship 
and thus failing to act with some sympathy will fall short of what would be normally expected of 
us in our society.  Perhaps we would not judge someone harshly in the face of such failings, 
perhaps we would, but the point is that we are not just expected to perform a token of some act 
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type, but we are expected to do so with appropriate consideration and it is marked as a lack of 
not just civility but of ethical achievement to fail to do so. Ethical expectations do not just call 
for behavior, but they call for behavioral expressions of personal relationship and regard towards 
others.  Saliencies must equip us to an extent reflecting these expectations and the contribution of 
degrees of accord we might seek in our acts provides that equipment. 
 
 
Forms of Regard for Others--With Different Families of Ethics 
 
One other element of our regard of others or ourselves as we act will make a difference to 
saliencies that are legitimate and to whether we meet the ethical expectations upon us.  We are 
not just subject to the expectations of morality, or of law, but these and also the expectations of 
economics or prudence and perhaps as a matter of fact less so, the expectations of aesthetics in 
our personal life.  These various ethics seem naturally associated with various regards we might 
hold the other in as we act.  And here I am speaking of the regard we hold that other’s interests in 
as we act and are entangled with the other.  Different ethics seem to be associated with or seem 
open to characterization in part in terms of one or another of differing regards we might hold the 
interests of others in as we act.  Notice that as we interact, we can regard others as: 
 
1. competitors for scarce goods such as food, money, status 
2. as individuals for whose well being we are responsible (either in terms of what we might 
provide or what we might refrain from removing) in the eyes of a impartial third party-
power 
3. as individuals whose well being we are responsible for (either in terms of what we might 
provide or what we might refrain from removing) just in so far as they are agents or 
capable of being agents in their own right and 
4. as individuals whose well being or flourishing as an agent is important to our achieving a 
certain satisfying style or felt fittingness or comfort in our own life as an agent and in our 
lives together as agents in the personal and the social of our becoming. 
 
Each of these regards can be seen as being a capacity we have as agents; a capacity for 
meeting others, those with whom we are or become entangled, on certain terms.  And although I 
hesitate to suggest that this is any more than the way things have come to be—not a matter of the 
transcendentally defined possibilities, it seems likely that as full agents we will always approach 
others (in ethical behavior) through one of these regards toward their interests just as we 
approach them striving for some degree of accord or engagement.  Thus we need to attune 
legitimacy to these possibilities and we might type reasons accordingly as their saliencies are 
constrained according to one kind of ethic or another.  Thus these forms of regard and their 
presence in our interactions with others give point to various kinds of ethical reasons and the 
associated norms so that each is a kind of regard that is seen to or expressed effectively by our 
guiding our choices according to a certain sort of  (potentially competing) ethic.  For 1. there is 
prudence or economic reasoning in ethics, for 2. there is law, for 3. there is morality, for 4. 
aesthetics.  These regards of the other’s interests and the accompanying ethics are all sources of 
ethical rules understood according to what some call a material or substantive condition and not 
just a formal condition, even though the rules in these ethics have formal conditions as well.  
Thus formally, the ethic attuned to 1. comprises rules that are naturally enforced and both 
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formally and informally articulated, 2. comprises a set of rules that are formally enforced and 
articulated, 3. comprises a set of rules informally enforced and articulated, and 4. comprises 
norms resting in the pre-reflective and expressed only intuitively (and perhaps these norms are 
not even expressible as rules but can be articulated only as personal openings of perception even 
when cast as commentary offered in the social setting of the production of style and art). 
Thus by looking to the sensitivities expressed in the saliencies through which we meet the 
world we might develop agonistic and mutualistic ethics appropriate to different levels of 
engagement with those of significance with whom/which we become entangled.  And these 
ethics can further be divided into different kinds depending upon the kind of regard for the 
interests of those others which the rules allow us to express and pursue in our actions. 
Saliencies indeed must be constrained by considerations of legitimacy.  But on the view I 
have suggested here, this constraint does not leave ethics as merely formally ensured expressions 
of impartiality.  Ethics are also properly partial in a number of ways, and most generally and 
commonly, they are partial as a function of the terms upon which we meet others in our presence 
in agency space.  And yet these forms of partiality can be seen as either limits on the 
constraining influence of impartiality in the generation of reasons for action, or as nuances in the 
ways the constraining influences of impartiality attune our saliencies and then reasons for action 
to the world as we meet it through the various limited forms our regard of others in fact takes in 
our acts.  In other words, the font of ethics or the source of ethical content is not merely in the 
spirit of critical thinking translated through the spirit of ethics as expressed in constraints of 
impartiality.  Rather that font is found not only in impartiality, but also in our own capacities and 
in our need to act always with an eye on some degree of accord with or engagement with others, 
and with one or another of the kinds of regard we might have toward another’s welfare as we 
proceed. And of course it is found in the wholly partial personal history and agenda we bring to 
the act. 
We must be careful in our choices of the perspective upon which we meet others, that is in 
our sought after accord and our regard of others, if we are to be responsible.  Different sorts of 
ethics will make most sense only with different sorts of accords, because the different degrees of 
engagement go well only with different sorts of regards. And even more might be asked of us in 
so far as we might be called upon to elevate one of the possible sorts of ethics above the others—
for then we would possibly be expected to elevate one level of engagement above the others. 
And conversely, it might well be that if we are to get the most out of life to flourish fully, as the 
kinds of agents we are or can become, we would need to strive to reach the deepest level of 
accord or, that is, the fullest engagement possible with other beings –perhaps human and other 
beings.  And in that case, the striving for a self-realizing accord would drag along ethical regard, 
for perhaps only moral or aesthetic regard might be suitable to that degree of accord.  Thus 
morality or aesthetics and the affect/level of engagement of identity might play out as the ideal 




Section VI. The End Game of Legitimating Ethical Saliencies  
 
Thus in this discussion I have explored some aspects of the problem of legitimacy in 
ethics and the relation found in salience that is legitimate between the spirit of critical thinking 
and what might be called the spirit of ethical agency.   In creating a socially real world in which 
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there is a spirit of ethical agency linked as I have suggested to a spirit of critical thinking, we 
engage in the task of making ethics and ethical expectations socially real, and so linking salience 
and legitimacy.  Thus on the view presented here, this enterprise of making ethics socially real 
and attuned to our saliencies is an enterprise of making socially real the sprit of critical thinking 
within the realm of the guidance of interpersonal relations.  And this enterprise is one best 
understood in terms of nurturing the virtues of living in the spirit of ethical agency, not in terms 
of the evidentiary relations underlying justification of ethical claims.  As such this undertaking is 
something we can understand as part of our attempt to live in a world of responsible agency.  It is 
not something we can justify by appeal to the way of things. 
Is there some way we might justify the call for living within the spirit of critical agency 
and then the spirit of ethical agency?  The constraints comprising the critical spirit limit the 
articulation of norms of both critical and ethical thinking, but this does not mean that we are 
bound by them simply because we must think critically or ethically, if at all.  (Habermas, Apel 
and the claims of communicative ethics notwithstanding.)  Rather they come to us through a 
voluntary commitment to use and follow critical reason in our life.  But once undertaken, as this 
commitment is expressed in action it will amount to an expression of impartiality in ethics.  And 
so, this commitment will be lived in our agency as though we have committed to live according 
to impartial ethical guidance. 
Thus, I hold to a weak (or really, a voluntaristic) ethical internalism that seems to be 
embedded within a commitment to the spirit of critical thinking.  On this view, as we seek after 
the legitimacy of norms that might guide us to living well, what we should pay attention to is 
neither evidentiary relationships between reasons and avowed attitudes or choices, nor formal 
constraints upon intentions or upon maxims of action.  (At least these are not pertinent when we 
are speaking of the project of understanding the proper selection of norms and their prospective 
influence in our lives.  If these influences can be presupposed in a retrospective context of 
holding someone to account for what was done, we could properly turn our attention to the 
evidentiary relationships between norms and claims about what was right or wrong or permitted 
in the circumstances.)  Instead of looking at the evidentiary and formal conditions of legitimate 
norms, we should find our way to the ethical by turning toward the formation and enactment of 
virtues expressed in lived or socially real perspectives on legitimacy--virtues which are formed 
in co-evolution with and so in a way reflecting and expressing the personal affect of the ethical 
agent.  This captured, we will have as a basis of reasons in ethics not the truth of what a separate 
reality demands of us ethically, but the verisimilitude of what our being in the world as an ethical 
agent demands of us.  Thus in seeking norms to live by we will seek what in our presence in the 
world has the intersubjective appearance of being true, that is what is known to be true of our 
reality as we live in it—even if what we think we find true of that lived reality is not any part of 
or even supervenient upon any set of objective features of the world.  What we will have then 
will possess the ring of truth, so that it seems really to fit the world in every way practical for our 
actions.  And we will reflect this in our reasoning within in our communities of ethical inquiry 
about particular expressions of right or permitted courses of action, and then in our claims about 
the evidentiary relationships within that reasoning.  Of course, this reasoning will amount to a 
personal construction of the permitted and the defense of this in accountability to others will 
amount to a construction of the social reality of the permitted.  Nevertheless, to ensure this much 
of our practice of life within the spirit of critical agency, we shall have constructed and will be 
maintaining a world as real as we might ever live.  That much is perhaps the closest we come to 
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1 Even this, as circumspect as it is, would be considered by some to be too “thick” a picture of 
normativity.  See Dancy’s introduction for example:  “It is often said that normativity is the 
characteristic common to everything that appears on the ‘ought’ side of the distinction between 
what is and what ought to be”  (Dancy 2000. vii). But as Dancy himself says, this is too 
restrictive in the forms of assessment it includes.  Further, it tendentiously assumes we can make 
a clear distinction between what is and what ought to be, and finally, as we shall see, in its 
turning to a clear distinction between the way things are and the way they ought to be the 
approach draws our attention away from important social dimensions of our living with 
normative constraints. 
 
2 I shall not hereafter continue to add “or belief, or choice” though unless otherwise qualified, I 
will intend these additions to fall within the scope of my statements. 
 
3 For presentations of ideal observer theories and related relevant epistemologies, see Brandt, 
Firth, Rawls, and for one discussion of related points see Gibbard. 
 
4 Once again the complex process hinted at here might be fully conscious and deliberate, or 
might be found below the conscious level and so appear automatic. 
 
5 From now on I shall avoid the cumbersome repetition of  “or could have” to indicate that not all 
thought and action meeting normative expectations need proceed from a conscious, and 
reflective or deliberate review of the legitimacy of the salient or relevant alternatives. 
 
6 This might be the point at which to comment on a possible objection—namely, that legitimacy 
of the sort I have spoken of is only that attuned to the individual responsibility of a critical 
thinker or an ethical agent operating on her or his own.  Wouldn’t things be different for the 
thinker or agent as a member of a collective or as constrained by the requirements of a large 
social or economic or political system of which the agent is a functioning member?  (Bradley for 
example speaks this way at points in “My Station and Its Duties,”  [see Bradley 1962], as does 
Royce [see Royce 1929. 264-265] and contemporary communitarians.)   Indeed, is this not one 
benefit of the wisdom of evolution as expressed in epigenic rules in sociobiology—see Ruse?  
Also see Deep Ecologists and perhaps social ecologists.)   Mightn’t our responsibility both as a 
critical thinker and as an ethical agent be to hew to the party line or to respect the needs of the 
species, for example, to the exclusion of the endorsement of individually legitimate acts of the 
sort endorsed above?  Well, to be sure, on reflection we might commit ourselves to such a 
program.  But we cannot escape the responsibility we have for doing so only after examination 
into the legitimacy of doing so as discussed above.  Sociobiology and the rest do not claim blind 
allegiance shutting off all thought except that which is the party line.  Rather they present 
reasons for adopting that party line and defending it against all comers.  Thus even here the 
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presumption in the practice of legitimacy is that individual critical responsibility is always 
foundational and never satisfied.  (For a similar point made in a dissimilar but related context, 
see Bergson 1935. 12.) 
 
7 In what follows then, I will be working on the issue of what puts us in a position to demand an 
act or line of action of the self or others.  This can be approached in terms of looking at the 
demand and the making of the demand to find authoritativeness.  But I shall be taking a different 
approach—namely that of seeking to understand the position of authority as a position in a 
relationship and seeking to understand its origins in terms of what might constitute that 
relationship.  One question here is whether each critical or ethical agent always has standing as 
an authority for self and others at least in some matters.  I will be working toward a positive 
answer.  (See also Gibbard on fundamental authority  (Gibbard 1990. 175 and ff).) 
 
8 See Dancy 2000 who distinguishes an act’s being “favoured by the circumstances” from its 
being “demanded by the situation.”  What is “favoured” seems in Dancy’s thinking to be a 
comparative matter since different options might be more or less favored while being demanded 
in a situation is not a comparative matter.  “’Demanded’ does not just mean ‘most/more 
favoured’” (Dancy 2000. viii). I take it that part of what is at issue here is that the normativity of 
an option of action (or, presumably, of a belief) might accord it a status of being fully or 
supremely abstractly authoritative over us, or might afford those who expect it an 
incontrovertible personal authority over us, or might accord their personal authority a primacy 
over ours in the matter at hand.  If Railton (2000) is correct it will be this primacy that is 
accorded to the normativity of all of morality (over that of prudence or economic self-interest for 
example) and is felt in our feeling compelled (if we do) to conform our reason and attitude (and 
so our conduct and our undertakings) to the demands of morality. 
 
9 This is similar in its pretensions to what Alan Gibbard (1990) calls “fundamental authority,” 
but differs from Gibbard’s notion in being limited to what I have called personal authority and 
being only presumed for agents in some societies whereas fundamental authority seems more 
like a form of abstract authority and something anyone can claim at any time within and across 
various groups circumscribed by accountability on certain matters. 
 
10 Why should the grant be mutual and more or less pervasive?  I have argued elsewhere that if 
one is able to extend recognition giving standing, and to grant accountability (which presupposes 
recognizing as having standing those to whom we give our accountability), then in these boons 
we exercise ethical standing ourselves—we cannot bestow standing without having it.  But 
where might we gain this?  On my view we could gain it only in the way others gain it from us, 
by someone granting us standing.  Thus having ethical standing I consider to be a reciprocal 
condition relating ethical agents.  If I am right above, then, a presumption of normativity finds its 
social reality only within this reciprocity.  (See for example, Blatz 1998.) 
 
11 Consider Christopher Hookway’s distinction between two ways of inquiring into the 
credentials of epistemic norms:  First, “Deliberation can be carried out well or poorly; and in 
general we hope that if our deliberations are carried out well, they will lead to true justified 
beliefs” (Hookway 2000. 60). Second: “We can examine the normative standards that guide us 
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when we try to carry out theoretical deliberations and conduct inquiries.  These norms will guide 
us in formulating cognitive goals and selecting methods of deliberation or inquiry to employ in 
pursuit of them.  Unlike the first focus, this one should reveal connections and parallels between 
norms of practical and of theoretical rationality” (Hookway 2000. 60, 61). This distinction 
corresponds to what I intend between the evidentiary and virtue approaches to abstract and 
personal legitimacy, respectively.  (See Hookway 2000. 60-62.) 
 
12 Note that this felt importance has a valence that is positive or negative and that seeds or results 
from and reinforces the possibility of our articulating our experience of the world in terms in part 
containing ethical judgments of the options, circumstances or persons we engage in that 
experience. Thus to engage the world through this experience is to engage it, even if pre-
consciously, on terms embodying assessments.  And to this extent, I agree with those who like 
Putnam (2002. 128,129) and McNaughton (1988. 55) and ff.) would speak of ethical or moral 
perception.  But my suggestion here should indicate that this does not clearly commit me to 
ethical realism or to the existence of moral properties to explain this perception.  Also see 
footnote 18 below. 
 
13 And, in what follows I am interested only in the epistemic dimensions of salience in action.  
See footnote 18, below. 
 
14 The system of retributive justice—blame or punishment traditionally has been brought in to 
play this role for those who could have but lack the commitment and do not seek to live by it. 
 
15 In effect, this is the question lying behind Kant’s constructivism—what constraints upon the 
maxim of an action or that is upon the operation of salience, might allow that salience to be a 
guide to legitimacy?  Rawls’s version of Kantian constructivism can be seen in the same way, 
namely as an attempt to constrain , in this case personal self-interested preference for basic 
principles of justice so that the salience of patterns of acts due to that self interest might generate 
a preference for legitimate universal principles of justice.  Korsgaard 1996. Sec. 4.2.8. 140, 
seems involved in a similar project. 
 
16 The classical account of an explanation of deep disagreements is in Fogelin 1985.  More 
recently I have pursued the understanding and resolution of such disagreements in Blatz 1997.  
My account there is the basis of the exposition to follow below.  For a different account see 
Gibbard, 1990. Chaps. 10,13. 
 
17 Thus in deep disagreements, as I understand them, we are confronted not necessarily with an 
incommensurability of meaning of terms expressing the perspectives, but with some sort of 
crucial difference in the construction and epistemic commitments of the perspectives involved.  
For example, as Gibbard might put it, we are here confronted with a difference of norms of 
warrant, or rationale, or both between the perspectives.  (See Gibbard 1990. Chap.11.)  Some of 
these conflicts are those discussed in detail by Lyotard as differends where the statement of one 
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18 Here and elsewhere, I speak loosely allowing views according to which critical reasoning 
limits or inhibits or otherwise constrains the given saliencies our psychology makes us 
susceptible to in our particular circumstances.  This is the sort of account we see in Korsgaard 
where impulse is shaped and made ethically presentable or defensible by reason.  But must 
constraint and impulse be separated in an account of salience?  Why not speak of salience as an 
expression of such constraint in the very operations of our responses to the world—why not 
refuse to separate out impulse from reason’s influence in screening, shaping, and then rejecting 
or affirming the impulse we have in some particular circumstances?  Do we see someone 
physically abusing a child and feel offended by that and moved to take some action to stop it, or 
is it that see someone repeatedly striking a child and feel an impulse to resist that only to have 
reason come in with an affirmative assessment of the defensibility of that feeling and perhaps a 
sanction of acting on that impulse?  Does impulse precede and become limited by reason as 
Korsgaard and others suggest, or is it the case that the two are felt together and for all practical 
purposes are inseparable?  If they are separate, are there two impulses operating in such cases—
the impulse to intervene on behalf of the child and the impulse to follow reason as it directs in 
the case?  Reason might council caution if we know enough about the case—suppose the child 
has just done a horrible thing to someone else and will never be prosecuted or otherwise dealt 
with beyond the intervention of the parent who has hit the child, or it might counsel rapidity of 
intervention—perhaps the parent is a drunk and prone to physically abusing those in her or his 
family.  But does that knowledge then enter into the response only to constrain our original 
impulse attached to the felt importance of the child being struck, and does it do so as part of the 
impulse to follow reason in the case?  So then we see the child struck, feel the impulse to 
intervene, judge this impulse by reference to whatever information and norms might be relevant 
and then are moved by our impulse to follow reason to only follow the impulse to intervene in so 
far as it is an expression of our judgment of what is reasonable or called for in the case on the 
basis of legitimate reasons?  I am tempted to say that these complications will cause the account 
to fall of its own weight.  But that impulse aside, if the agent is committed to follow reason, then 
to a degree appropriate to that commitment the agent, for all practical purposes, will respond to 
the situation marking the child’s being struck as cruel or abusive and then will move forward to 
intervene, or will mark the child’s being struck as harsh or a failing or sad, but as an act 
precipitated by the child’s behavior and if not fitting at least not a proper occasion for 
intervention.  And the response could have been made without the agent thinking reflectively 
about any of this.  “Look Henrietta/Herb is really laying into little Harry!”  Thus in such cases, 
there is no point in making the separations between impulse, belief, constraint and commitment 
to constraint.  If the agent’s account would show that the response was heartfelt and so hewed to 
the line of her reasons for acting as well as beliefs about the situation (as opposed to being a 
matter of whimsy or compulsion, or acting from ignorance), and the reasons and beliefs hold up 
as defensible in an accountability context, then that would be enough for the agent to have acted 
on an impulse appropriately constrained by reason or to have expressed a salience that is 
appropriately tied to legitimacy. 
 Perhaps we might think of cases where initially it seems natural to separate the impulse to 
act and the constraining influence of reason.  For example, because of anger, fear or some other 
dominant emotion, we feel an impulse to act in some way and have to check our action as we 
think through the case at hand to see what might be the best thing to do—“count to ten before 
you act.”  But these seem to be cases where a judgment already has been made and its influence 
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felt in our impulses—the occasion of anger or fear has been marked as something calling for the 
response we feel impelled to.  And yet, so the description continues, we are just not sure whether 
we should go ahead because of the operation of another reasoned impulse we have acquired, 
namely, to hesitate and think things through reflectively rather than go with our pre-consciously 
constrained impulses.   These cases show no clear reason to separate impulse from constraint of 
reason(s).  Korsgaard’s position is not the only one we might take here, or even a clear one.  
There is no clear reason to make the separation between reason  and impulse constrained by 
reason, as if we even would know what that means short of a sophisticated (and partially) 
physiological account. 
 So there seems to be no point in treating the question before us in the text as a question of 
the mechanics or dynamics of ethical psychology.  Rather, as I treat it in what follows, the 
question is one of the epistemology of ethics.  Perhaps this epistemic turn is the real point of 
Putnam’s criticism of Korsgaard and his discussion of what he calls moral perception.  (See 
Putnam, 2002.128-129.)  I am inclined toward a view according to which we experience the 
world in terms that are expressive of the saliencies and associated normative valences we feel in 
those experiences though I am not at all sympathetic to Putnam’s realism as an account of the 
epistemic grounds these normative experiences provide. 
 
19 This is the way Gibbard uses the term “tolerance.”  Of course, some forms of tolerance might 
be quite personal and very intricate in their mutual accommodations.  However, we might also 
speak of mere tolerance in the way in question here.  I shall follow Gibbard in his rather more 
restricted use of the term.  (See Gibbard 1990 Chap.13.) 
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